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Comments

I

A Closer Look: The U.S. Senate's
Failure to Ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty
A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be
like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting
less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could
wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and
Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere.
And the
survivors... the survivors would envy the dead. For they would
inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire
that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try
to turn the world away from war. Let us make the most of this
opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow
down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's
slide toward final annihilation.
President John F. Kennedy

1. President John F. Kennedy's Radio and Television Address to the
American People, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 601 (July 26, 1963).
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Introduction

On October 13, 1999,2 the U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.3 As a result of this
vote, many debates have arisen as to whether the vote put the
U.S. in a weaker position throughout the world regarding
national security and moral leadership.' Concerns have arisen
from foreign leaders and ambassadors, as well as from the
American people and their leaders. These concerns regard the
aftermath of the vote on world security and partisan politics,
foreign affairs and national security issues.'
A major world issue is whether the treaty, which has been in
the works for over five years, will wither away and die as a result
of the Senate's decision.' Over the past forty years the U.S., as a
superpower, has had enormous influence over nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation throughout the world.7 Since the
days of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959 and John F.
Kennedy in the 1960's, the road to a nuclear test ban treaty has
been paved.8
However, national security concerns have increased in the
U.S. and other countries, such as Russia, China, India, and
Pakistan, with the recent increase in nuclear weapon development throughout the world. 9 The increase of these developments
makes the world a much more dangerous place, especially
recently in times of Asian friction and more specifically
concerning a territory conflict between India and Pakistan.' °
2. 145 CONG. REC. S12504-01 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1999) (Senate Vote on
Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).
3. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24,
1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105.28 [hereinafter Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or
CTBT].
4. Jack Kelley, U.S. Rebuked on Test Ban Vote Nations Cite 'Dangerous'
Message, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 1999, at 01A.
5. Id.
6. Barbara Crossette, World Leaders Criticize the U.S. for Defeat of Test Ban
Treaty, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 1999, at 12A.
7. World: South Asia 'Constructive' US-Pakistani Talk, BBC NEWS ONLINE

at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south-asia/newsid_158000
/158344.stm (last modified Aug. 25, 1998).
8. 145 CONG. REC. S12278 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (Senate debate on the
CTBT).
9. Videotape: THE CTBT - A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF SENATE ACTION
(Arms Control Association 1999) (on file with The Brookings Inst.).
10. Michael Fathers, with reporting by Meenaski Ganguly and Maseeh
Rahman, Ghulan Hasnain and Yusuf Jameel, On the Brink; Spring Has Only Just
NETWORK,

Arrived, but After Pakistani Incursions, Indian Bombings and Downed Aircraft,
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It is the conflict between India and Pakistan that draws
many concerns. Tensions and periodic fighting have existed
between these bordering neighbors since their independence
from Great Britain in 1947." The tension became a significant
world issue a two and a half years ago when first India and then
Pakistan began underground testing of nuclear weapons in May
of 1998.12 Until that point, there was no known public threat that
either country would become a nuclear power. 3 The recent
strains between the two countries have evolved over a decadelong border conflict concerning the Kashmir territory. 4 It is
feared that the newest bloodshed in the Kashmir conflict
between the two nations in May 1999, sparked the advent of a
very real possibility of nuclear war. 15
An even greater threat of nuclear war between India and
Pakistan emerges from the coup of Pakistani Prime Minister6
Nawaz Sharif and his recently elected democratic government.
Over the past two and a half years, U.S. officials have had
several conversations with Indian and Pakistani officials
concerning the testing and development of their nuclear
arsenals. 7 As a result of the overthrow of the Pakistani
government, the U.S. and the rest of the international
community are unsure about any ensuing Pakistani nuclear
testing or detonation policies.18
In the same week that the nuclear threat in South Asia
became more tense, the U.S. decided not to ratify the nuclear
test ban treaty which it had been progressively persuading India
and Pakistan to sign. 9 This U.S. abandonment of the treaty may
adversely affect Indian and Pakistani decisions to sign the
treaty 0 Because of the appearance of the U.S. deserting the
Kashmir is FacingIts Most DangerousSeason in Years, TIME, June 7, 1999, at 16.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Fathers, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. Celia W. Dugger, No Timetable to Restore Pakistani Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at A10.
17. Supra note 7.
18. Jonah Blank & Tasgola Karla Bruner, The Generals Step In: A Military
Coup Puts Pakistan's Democracy on Hold, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25,
1999, at 39.
19. Romesh Ratnesar, The Good News Coup? Pakistanis Exult Over the Fall
of Sharif. But Will Military Rule Make the Volatile Subcontinent Any Safer?, TIME,

Oct. 25, 1999, at 21.
20. Dugger, supra note 16.
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treaty, the Senate's vote may indeed affect the ratification
possibilities of Russia and China, the other two "big five"
nuclear powers that have not ratified the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which will in turn have a greater effect
on whether India and Pakistan, and other rogue states will sign
the CTBT.2'
Because of its probable devastation of the CTBT
community's efforts, leaders from around the world have
condemned the U.S.' decision not to ratify the test ban treaty at
this time. 22 Although the treaty may go back to the Senate floor
for ratification again, many people around the world believe this
to be the beginning of the end for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
and for the moral influence 23 and power that the U.S. has
concerning world affairs. It may also be the consequential event
that 24sends the world spiraling into an all-consuming nuclear
war.

This comment will discuss the background of the
Comprehensive
Nuclear Test
Ban
Treaty,
American
disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, recent American
partisan politics regarding the Clinton administration and the
CTBT, and finally the ongoing conflict between India and
Pakistan. After the background discussion, the arguments for
and against the CTBT will be outlined and there will be a
discussion of the way the Senate handled the vote on the treaty.
Concluding the comment will be a discussion regarding the
aftermath of the Senate vote and the future of the CTBT.

21. Videotape: TEST ANXIETY: SHOULD AMERICA RATIFY THE CTBT? (ADM
1999) (on file with the Center for Defense Information). The "Big Five" Nuclear
powers are the U.S., Russia, China, France and Britain. Id. All five of these
countries have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but only
France and Britain have successfully ratified the document. Id. The U.S. was the
first country, not just the first of the "Big Five," to vote on and reject the treaty.
Id.
22. John Diamond, PresidentAssails GOP Over Failed Treaty, World Reaction
Swift, Negative, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1999, at 1. Leaders from Russia, Britain and
Japan have made public comments regarding the Senate's vote as a major setback
to the goals of the treaty's entry into force. Id.
23. 145 CONG. REC. S12277 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (Senate debate on the
CTBT). Moral influence refers to the persuasive power the U.S. has in the world
as a role model. Id. This influence is based on the premise of one country acting
as an example for other countries as to how to behave concerning international
affairs. See id.
24. Byron Dorgan & Arlen Specter, U.S. Wants, Needs Nuclear Test Ban Pact,

U.S.A.

TODAY,

Sept. 13, 1999, at 27A.
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Background

A.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
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Negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty began at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva in
January 1994." The final draft, sponsored by 127 nations, was
submitted to the United Nations General Assembly two years
later and adopted on September 10, 1996.26
Under the scope of the treaty, each State Party undertakes
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion. In addition, the treaty prohibits and prevents
any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or
control. Further, the treaty's State Parties are to refrain from
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying
out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion.'
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is the result
and culmination of over forty years28 worth of efforts toward the
ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons in the world.
Preceding the CTBT was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963
prohibiting all nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space
and under water, but not underground. 29 Next, the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty of 1974 limited the yield of underground nuclear
weapon tests to 150 kilotons. 0 But perhaps the most important
arms control treaty in force today is the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, because of the states parties' promises not to 31 trade
nuclear weapons and because of its influence over the U.S.

25.

Daryl Kimball, Chronology of Key Events in the Effort to End Nuclear

Weapons Testing: 1945-1999, at http://www.clw.org/coalition/ctch4050.htm

(last

modified June 1999). The Geneva Conference on Disarmament was attended by
172 of countries. Id.
26. Id.
27. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Art. I (Basic Obligations) (1996).
28. Kimball, supra note 25. In April 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of
India proposed that the nuclear weapon testing should be suspended. Id.

29. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, opened for signature September 8, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480
U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty or LTB].

30. TTBT, supra, note 9.
31.

TOM Z.

COLLINA, ET AL., FOR A SAFER AMERICA:

THE CASE FOR A

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY 3 (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers 2d
ed. 1999). The U.S. used the CTBT as a negotiating tool to extend the life of the
NPT. Id.
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These international arms control agreements have been and
will continue to be crucial for the existence of world peace and

stability. Since the day of the first nuclear weapons explosion in
July 1945,32 to the signing date of the CTBT,33 over 2,000 test

explosions have been registered. In existence today, there are
over 12,000 nuclear weapons throughout the U.S. and Russia
alone, any one of which could start a nuclear holocaust. The
CTBT is the most comprehensive arms control agreement that
has ever been proposed at a multi-national level, proffering a
zero yield testing ban?'
The CTBT document consists of a preamble, seventeen

articles, two annexes and a Protocol. The Protocol contains two
annexes and describes verification procedures. One annex lists
the 337 facilities comprising the International Monitoring System
(IMS) 35 and the other annex describes parameters for standard
event screening by the International Data Center (IDC) created
by the treaty. 36 The CTBT also establishes an Executive Council
which would be comprised of 51 states and a Technical Director-

General who will assist States Parties to implement the treaty
and carry out verification and other functions.37
For the Treaty to be entered into force, forty-four 38 of the

States' Parties listed in Annex two39 of the Treaty must have
deposited their instruments of ratification with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. At this time, thirty-one of these
states have ratified the treaty.
32. Id. In July 1945, the U.S. was the first country to conduct a nuclear
weapon test. Id.
33. Kimball, supra note 25. The CTBT was opened for signature and signed
first by the U.S. on September 24, 1997. Id.
34. Id. A zero yield test ban would not allow any nuclear explosions. Id.
35. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Annex 1 (1996).
36. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Annex 11 (1996).
37. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Art. 11 (1996).
38. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Art. XIV (Entry Into Force)
(1996). The Treaty requires that 44 specific States Parties ratify it for it to go into
effect. Id. These states are those that are believed to have some ability to build at
least a crude bomb. Id.
39. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Art. II (1996). The States
Parties who must ratify the CTBT in order for it to be entered into force are
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland,
Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, U.S. of America, Viet Nam, Zaire. Annex II, CTBT. Id.
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In order to understand fully the theories behind a need for
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it is necessary to look to
the history of nuclear testing, the international community's
views on disarmament and the politics of the nuclear powers'
decisions involving nuclear policy. The discussion begins with
the U.S. because of its leading role in the international
community as the only stable world power in the aftermath of
the Cold War. °
B.

American Disarmamentand Nonproliferation

Since the presidencies of Eisenhower' and Kennedy42 , the
American nuclear weapon trend has been to clear a new path4
4
toward the goals of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
In the past two decades, there have been treaties agreed to
between the U.S. and other foreign nations concerning the
futures of nuclear 45 and chemical' weapons and testing. In 1992,
President George Bush signed a legislative moratorium' on
nuclear testing. Today, the U.S. nuclear policy is to continue not
to test its nuclear weapons, but to maintain its nuclear arsenal.
The U.S. was the first to test nuclear weapons and deploy
bombs in 1945 leading to worldwide proliferation of nuclear
arsenals.
Soon after the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki during World War II, 4' the then Union of Soviet

40. 145 CONG. REc. S12268 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (Senate debate on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).
41.

WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE 1665 (New Revised ed. 1997). Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency ran

from 1953-1961. Id.
42. Id. John F. Kennedy's presidency ran from 1961-1963. Id.
43. Id. Disarmament is defined as the act or instance of disarming; the
reduction or limitation of the size, equipment, armament, etc., of the army, navy,
or air forces of a country. Id.
44. Id. Nonproliferation is defined as a failure or refusal to proliferate; the
action or practice of curbing or controlling an excessive, rapid spread. Id.
45. Treaty Between the U.S. of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Test, opened for
signatureJuly 3, 1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-19, KAV 1782, 2607
[hereinafter Threshold Test Ban Treaty or TTBT].
46. The Chemical Weapons Treaty creates a limit to the kinds of chemical
weapons that may be legally used in warfare. S. Res. 75, 105th Cong. (1997)
(enacted).
47.

137 CONG. REc. S13939

(1992)

(Hatfield-Exon Amendment).

A

Moratorium is defined as an order of suspension or cessation of some act.
WEBSTER'S

ENCYCLOPEDIC

UNABRIDGED

DICTIONARY

OF

THE

ENGLISH

LANGUAGE 1665 (New Revised ed. 1997).

48.

Kimball, supra note 25. The U.S. bombed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945,
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Socialists Republic 9 , the United Kingdom, France and China
began testing their own nuclear weapons. ° With the rapid
increase of the existence of nuclear weapons in the world,
tensions heightened regarding the possibility of nuclear war.
The Cold War era5 of the 1940s to 1980s escalated those
tensions. From the first nuclear test in 1945, to the end of the
Cold War in the late 1980s, over 2,000 nuclear tests had been

conducted.52 Recognizing the rapidly deteriorating likelihood of
world peace with every nuclear test being conducted, the U.S.
and the USSR discussed a nuclear test ban in 1954." 3 Many
proposals and talks occurred throughout the next few years, but
the two superpowers failed to reach an agreement. President
Eisenhower proposed a conference to explore test ban
verification in 1958 in order to promote further a nuclear test
ban." On August 22, 1958, President Eisenhower proposed a
one-year test moratorium, contingent to a Soviet refrain from
testing.55 This initiated the first test ban negotiations between
the U.S., the United Kingdom and the USSR.56
In February 1960, President Eisenhower's administration

proposed a comprehensive test ban, banning all nuclear tests in
the atmosphere, oceans, space and beneath the surface of the
earth.57

The USSR initially accepted the proposal making it

and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, leading to over 200,000 casualties. Id.
49. Hereinafter referred to as Russia for the period after the cold war, and as
the USSR for the period during the cold war.
50. Id. The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test explosion on August
29, 1949. The United Kingdom conducted its first nuclear test on October 3, 1952.
Id. France conducted its first nuclear test in February, 1960. China conducted its
first nuclear weapons test on October 16, 1964. Id.
51. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Address to the
American People on the Nuclear Test Ban (July 26, 1963). The Cold War was a
term to describe intense economic, political and military rivalry just short of gunfired, military conflict. The term Cold War was primarily used to describe
relations between the U.S. and the USSR concerning conflicts in Berlin and Cuba.
WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED
LANGUAGE 1665 (New Revised ed. 1997).

DICrIONARY

OF

THE

ENGLISH

52. This statistic covers only tests of the "Big Five" nuclear weapons states.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Briefing Book: Total Tests By Calendar Year,
COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD, at http://www. clw.org/ef/ctbtbook/totals.html
(last modified Sept. 24, 1999).
53. Kimball, supra note 25.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Negotiations for a tri-lateral nuclear test ban began on October 31,
1958. Id.
57. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, News Conference on the Nuclear Test
Ban (Feb. 11, 1960).
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likely that the treaty would be signed." Due to increased Cold
War hostilities, however, the test ban proposal was postponed
until 1963."9
Test ban negotiations renewed in 1963 under President
Kennedy's administration.6
President Kennedy announced a
long range goal of complete disarmament, in which the U.S.
would refrain from conducting atmospheric tests, as long as
other states would also refrain.6" Due to disagreements over onsite inspections of nuclear testing facilities, an agreement could
not be reached concerning a comprehensive test ban.62 In the
alternative, the U.S., the USSR and Britain signed the Limited
Test Ban Treaty (LTB) on July 25, 1963. 6' The LTB limits the
testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, space and beneath
the surface of the ocean. 4 In an address to the American public,
President Kennedy reiterated his administration's long term goal
of complete disarmament, as well as his assurance that the
nation's security was not harmed by the LTB. 6
Throughout the 1970s, the non-proliferation process was
slow moving. Despite this, in 1974, the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT) went into effect for the U.S. and the USSR. 66
The TTBT limits the explosive yields of underground tests to 150
kilotons. 6 Between 1977 and 1980, American, British and Soviet
negotiators worked toward a comprehensive test ban treaty,
making substantial progress.'
However, after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and additional opposition from the U.S.,
the third opportunity for an agreement on a comprehensive test
ban expired.69 In 1986, under President Ronald Reagan's

58.

Id.

59. Kimball, supra note 25. The shoot-down of an American U-2 spy plane
over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960 led to an atmosphere of.heightened hostility
between the U.S. and the SOVIET UNION, crushing the chance for a test ban. Id.
60. Id. The USSR invited British and American negotiators to a Moscow
conference to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Id.
61. President John F. Kennedy, Address at American University on a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (June 10, 1963).
62.
63.

Id.
Kimball, supra note 25.

64. LTB, supra note 10.
65.

Supra note 61.

66. TTBT, supra note 9.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Kimball, supra note 25.
Id.
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administration, a fourth attempt at a comprehensive test ban
agreement with the Soviet Union failed."
The 1990s gave new hope to the idea of a comprehensive
test ban treaty. In 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the HatfieldExon amendment, which President George Bush signed.7 The
amendment put into effect a unilateral underground testing
moratorium for the U.S. 2 In January 1994, comprehensive test
ban treaty negotiations began in Geneva.73 The U.S. signed the
CTBT on September 24, 1996. 74 Senate politics allowed the
CTBT to sit in a foreign relations committee from September 22,
1997 when President Clinton submitted it for the U.S. Senate's
advice and consideration, until October 11, 1999, while the
Senate waited to vote on it for ratification.75 On October 13,
1999, the U.S. senate voted not to ratify the CTBT.76
The Senate's vote not to ratify the CTBT has become the
topic of much controversy. The world view and the view of a
majority of the American people is that partisan politics played a
detrimental and inappropriate role in the ratification vote.77 The
discussion now turns to an examination of the role of American
politics during President Clinton's administration.
C. Recent American Politics

During the administration of President Clinton in 1992,
there has been increasingly inflexible tension between U.S.
Republicans and Democrats in Congress. The tension only
intensified during the Congressional impeachment proceedings
of 1998.7
A majority of Congress' Republicans lobbied
extensively for the removal of President Clinton from U.S. office
for allegations of perjury concerning sexual harassment
investigations and the vastly publicized Monica Lewinsky
scandal.79
70.

Id.

71. Hatfield-Exon Amendment, supra note 24.
72 Id.
73. Kimball, supra note 25.
74. CTBT, supra note 2.
75. Kimball, supra note 25.
76. Robert A. Jordan, World a Less Safe Place for GOP After Test Ban Treaty
Rejection, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1999, at E4.
77. Id.
78. Kathy Kiley, 'It Ain't Over,' New Independent Counsel Says, U.S.A.
TODAY, Jan. 10, 2000, at 8A.
79. Id. The scandal concerned inappropriate sexual conduct by President
Clinton and an intern, Monica Lewinsky, and his alleged attempts to cover it up in
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There is a widely held belief in the political world that
elected House and Senate Republicans were bound and
determined not to allow President Clinton to have any political
victories throughout the remainder of his term in office.'
Reports state that since impeachment was defeated by a
marginal status, partisan politics were strictly in order in every
action that concerned Congress and the Clinton White House
Administration."' The 106th U.S. Congress, in term during2
Clinton's administration, was led by a majority of Republicans.
Former democratic president, Clinton is an avid supporter of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
In order to understand further why many Americans and
world officials think the defeat of the CTBT was primarily based
on partisan politics, it is necessary to investigate the arguments
for and against U.S. ratification of the CTBT.
It is first
necessary, however, to examine current situations in India and
Pakistan, as well as the nuclear policies of countries which also
have not yet ratified the CTBT.
D.

The India-PakistanConflict

Since their independence from Great Britain in 1947, India
and Pakistan have been to war twice over the long-disputed
Kashmir territory.'
Under a partition plan provided by the
Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was free to accede to

India or Pakistan." The Maharaja decided to accede to India,
signing over key powers to the Indian government."

Pakistan

believes that Kashmir should have become part of Islamabad

front of a Grand Jury and the American public. Id. There were also allegations
that the President gave Miss Lewinsky a job in order to relocate her and keep her
silence about the affair. Id.
80.

Kenneth T. Walsh, Where Are the Wise Men? Petty Politics, But Also a

Real Dispute, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1999, at 20.
81. See John Diamond, President Assails GOP Over Failed Treaty World
Reaction Swift, Negative, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1999, at 1; see also Charles
Babington and Michael Grunwald, President Requests Treaty Vote Deferral But
GOP Seeks A Delay UntilAt Least 2001, Bus. DAY (SOuTH AFRICA), Oct. 18, 1999
at 13.
82. There are currently 55 Republicans in the Senate and 45 Republicans in
the House of Representatives.
83. Fathers, supra note 10.
84. World: Q & A: Kashmir Dispute, BBC NEWS ONLINE NETWORK, available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/southasia/newisd_353000/353352.stm
(last modified Aug. 11, 2000).
85. Id.
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because Muslims are in the majority in the region."
The
partition of 1947, however, gave Muslims a state of their own,
Pakistan.87 India was created to have an independent land where
both Muslims and Hindus could live."
For the past ten years, Pakistan has backed a Muslim
separatist uprising in the Indian-held part of Kashmir. 9 Indian
security forces have been fighting to suppress the invasions
leaving more than 30,000 casualties. In recent years, Islamabad,
Pakistan has given covert support to battle-trained Islamic
extremists from outside Kashmir who seek to liberate the mainly
Muslim territory from Indian control. The infiltrators tend to
enter Indian-held Kashmir undercover of artillery bombardments from Pakistan.
The latest fighting between the two nations is taking place
over a 140-kilometer stretch of mountain ridges 4,500 meters
high near the strategic Indian garrison town of Kargil. 9° The
town lies on the only usable road between Srinagar, capital of
Indian Kashmir, to the west and Leh, another military
stronghold near the Chinese Border, to the east. During the
brutal winters the area is isolated from the rest of India by heavy
snow. At the first sign of spring, both armies move in to
reoccupy the heights they abandoned during the winter freeze. 9'
The spring of 1999 was a different situation. Indian forces
were taken by surprise when they found that approximately 600
infiltrators had taken advantage of the low snow levels to dig in
early on the high ground about five kilometers inside Indian
territory."' The infiltrators were occupying positions previously
held by the Indian army.93 The Indian forces were fighting up a
steep ravine on a frontal assault, which made it impossible to
dislodge the infiltrator forces.4 In addition, Pakistani long-range
guns destroyed part of the Indian army's main munitions dump
forcing the town's 10,000 inhabitants to flee.95 In June, for the
86.
87.

88.

Id.
Id.
Stephen Kinzer, The World Takes Notice: Kashmir Gets Scarier, N.Y.

TIMES, June 20, 1999, at 16.

89. Fathers, supra note 10.
90. Id. This is the highest battlefield in the world. World: Q & A, supra note

84.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Fathers, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Fathers, supra note 10.
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first time since the last war between India and Pakistan in 1971,
air raids occurred. The two countries have contradictory
versions on every aspect of the conflict.
Indian officials describe the infiltrators as a mix between
Pakistani soldiers and mercenaries and claim that the group is a
well-organized operation of the Pakistani army.96 Pakistan's
government denied that its forces were involved."
The
escalating conflict raised questions over Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif's relationship with Pakistani armed forces.98
During the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan talked with international
powers and asked for mediation in the conflict.99

India has

persistently refused any world involvement in the dispute.' In
May, 1998, India broke the international consensus of
nonproliferation when it tested a nuclear weapon underground
for the first time since 1974. '0' Not more than two weeks later,

rival Pakistan conducted its first underground nuclear test.
These actions did not come without consequences. The
U.S., pursuant to its non-proliferation laws, imposed serious
economic sanctions against both countries.1°2 Of the two
countries, Pakistan has been affected more seriously by the
sanctions because of its greater dependence on international
loans."
The two countries talked with the U.S. and other foreign
administrations concerning the return to non-proliferation.
Constructive talks have occurred between the U.S. and India and
Pakistan concerning the lifting of the imposed economic
° The talks have been aimed at getting the two South
sanctions.'O
Asian countries to sign the CTBT in an effort to resume
worldwide non-proliferation. Both countries insist that they will
not sign the treaty unless the other signs it as well. India's
concerns are more stringent and apprehensive. It stipulates that

96. Id.
97.

Id.

9& Id.
99. World: South Asia 'Constructive' US-Pakistani Talks, BBC NEWS ONLINE
NETWORK, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/southasia/newsid

158000/158344.stm (last modified Aug. 25, 1998).
100. Id.

101. Kimball, supra note 25.
102. Pakistan Tables Nuclear Offer, BBC NEWS ONLINE NETWORK, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/asia-nuclearcrisis/latestnews/newsid_
179000/179088.stm (last modified Sept. 24, 1998).
103. World: South Asia, supra note 99.
104. Id.
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the nuclear powers 5 particularly the "Big Five", should work
toward full nuclear disarmament to make India"° more equal and
secure in the world community.'O'
Both India and Pakistan indicated during their talks with the
U.S. that they would sign the treaty after the U.S. takes the lead
and ratifies the CTBT.1°
The two countries were under
enormous pressure from the major world leaders, especially from
the U.S..' °9
The movement toward Indian and Pakistani signatures on
the CTBT slowed when on October 12, 1999, the Pakistani army
led by General Pervez Musharraf took control of the
government. Musharraf arrested Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
on corruption charges after Sharif tried to fire the general. °
One week later, the CTBT's movement to attain Indian and
Pakistani signatures was further slowed to a near halt when the
U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the CTBT. The effect the U.S.
vote will have on India and Pakistan will have a major effect on
how other nuclear rogue states such as Korea, Iran and Iraq will
decide on the CTBT. The U.S. has always played the role of
moral leader and persuasive power. Now, the world asks itself,
as do American leaders, what is in store for the CTBT, the
nuclear arms race and the U.S. as a world leader.
III. The U.S. Senate's Vote on the CTBT
With the October 13, 1999, vote not to ratify the CTBT,
many questions have arisen concerning whether or not the treaty
was defeated on its merits or because of partisan politics and the
contempt many Republicans feel toward President Clinton. The
discussion begins with a critique of the Senate process for the
CTBT vote and the arguments for and against the test ban treaty.

105. Fathers, supra note 10. India considers the nuclear power nations to be the
"haves". Id.
106. Id. India considered itself to be a "have-not" before its nuclear tests in
May, 1998. Id.
107. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, Article Submitted to Foreign
Affairs. Quoted in "India's nuclear doctrine: A Pakistani perspective," Foreign
Minister of Pakistan read at Foreign relations in Washington, D.C., available at
http://www.pak.gov.pk/ personal/main/indiadoctrine.htm (last modified Sept/Oct

1998).
108. India & Pakistan Commit to Join CTBT by 1999 (Coalition to Reduce
Nuclear Dangers, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 30, 1998. (Vol. 2 at 1).
109. Id.
110. Dugger, supra note 16.
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A. Why the Wait? Why Now, Why So Quickly?

For two years, Senator Jesse Helms, the chairperson for the
Foreign Relations Committee, tied the CTBT up in committee
without conducting any hearings on the issues of a zero-yield
nuclear test ban. Without committee consideration, the treaty
could not go to the Senate floor for debate, nor could the rest of
Senate become informed on the substantial issues for
ratification.
1. A Fairand Comprehensive Debate Can Not Occur Until
the Committee Chair Allows It to Happen.-After he put his

signature on the CTBT as the U.S. leader and representative in
September 1996, President Clinton submitted the CTBT, along
with six safeguards, to the Senate for its advice and consent for
ratification of the treaty in September 1997. For two years, the
CTBT was held up in the Senate Foreign Relations committee at
the mercy of Republican right-wing extremist, Senator Jesse
Helms.
In those two years, Senate Democrats and the Clinton White
House administration repeatedly asked for hearings and debate
of the CTBT privately and publicly in speeches."1 Senator
Helms refused to satisfy the requests and made it perfectly clear
that he would not allow the vote to have even committee
consideration until after two other treaties passed through the
Senate, nonetheless full Senate consideration."'
Some Senate Republicans say that the Clinton
administration was threatening to tie up legislative business if
the CTBT vote did not come to the floor."3 In their minds, the

threat justified compromising the integrity of the U.S. and the
Senate by taking advantage of the structure of the American
political system. With only ten days notice and knowing that the
CTBT did not have the sixty-seven votes for the necessary twothirds majority vote for ratification," 4 Senator Helms scheduled
111.

This Week: Interview with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright (ABC

television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1999).
112. Videotape: TEST ANXIETY, supra note 21. In a letter to President Clinton
on January 21, 1998, Senator Helms wrote, "Mr. President, let me be clear: I will
be prepared to schedule committee consideration of the CTBT only after the
Senate has had the opportunity to consider the vote on the Kyoto Protocol and the
amendments to the ABM Treaty." Id.
113. Id.
114. The U.S. Constitution provides the Senate with the authority to make and
ratify international agreements with a two-thirds majority vote. U.S. CONST. art II,
§ 2, cl. 2.
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the vote to come to the floor on October 14, 1999 with only two

days of committee hearings. "5
2. A Legitimate and Statesmanlike Process is Necessary to
Argue the Merits of an Issue. -Many politicians argue that the

Senate vote on the CTBT was not done in a legitimate political
fashion."' A normal treaty ratification process would be on a
hearing schedule with several months' notice."' Typically when a

hearing schedule is set, political parties begin to lobby the public
and Senators heavily."8 President Clinton noted that every time
he tried to talk to a Senator concerning the CTBT vote, s/he
would respond by saying that the CTBT was not even on the
calendar and was not going to come up, making it difficult to
lobby Senators' support."9

Selected Republicans argue that the Democrats did not do
their homework while pushing for Senate consideration on the
treaty. 12
Those Republicans say that the Senate treaty
advocates, mostly Democrats, should have known they did not

have the requisite 67 votes and should not have pushed for the
vote.1 21 Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright and President
Clinton say they did not know that they would finally, after two
years, have the chance to lobby for Senator support2' They also

argue that they were at the least, pushing for committee
consideration and hearings.'2
This is the first major
international treaty to pass through the Senate with only two
days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings and a mere
fourteen hours of debate on the Senate floor.'24
115. President's Remarks at Press Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2035 (Oct. 14, 1999).
116. This Week, supra note 111.
117. President'sRemarks, supra note 115.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. This Week, supra note 111.
121. Id.
122. Id; see also President's Remarks at Press Conference on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2035 (Oct. 14,
1999).
123. This Week, supra note 111.
124. 145 CONG. REc. S12278 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (Senate debate of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The ABM Treaty had 8 days of Foreign
Relations Committee hearings, and 18 days of Senate debate on the floor of the
Senate. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1988 had 23 days of committee
hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee and 2 days of Senate floor
consideration. The START I Treaty had 19 days of hearings and 5 days on the
Senate floor. The START II Treaty had 8 days of Foreign Relations Committee
hearings and 3 days on the Senate floor. The Chemical Weapons Convention had
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To add insult to injury, with every major international treaty
to pass through the Foreign Relations Committee before the
CTBT, the Committee members create a report to make
determinations and to inform and give advice to Senators not on
the committee.'2' No report was created or filed for the Senators
on the CTBT issues. 6 In addition, there were Senators who had
made commitments on the CTBT vote before ever hearing a
debate on the merits of the case.' 27 In fact, most Senators did not
bother to attend the short debate on the Senate floor."l
Making matters seem that much worse in the CTBT Senate
process, Majority Leader Senator Lott would not defer the vote
as requested by President Clinton and 62 Senators just days
before the vote.2 9 Senator Lott stipulated that he would only
postpone the vote under two conditions: that President Clinton
write a letter requesting the delay and that the President promise
not to ask for Senate consideration on the CTBT again as long as
3
Mr. Clinton remained in office."
The President would not
promise to forego asking Senate consideration on the CTBT within
the following year.' Foreign policy concerns that ratification of the
CTBT is necessary in order to keep the Non-Proliferation Treaty
alive left the President unable to secure that promise to the
majority leader. 32 Senator Lott pushed the vote ahead, knowing
that the votes to ratify were not possible to attain. 33 In a gross
display of strategizing to defeat the agreement and its makers,
Senator Helms would not allow the six safeguards that the
14 days of hearings and 3 days on the Senate floor. The NATO Enlargement
Agreement had 7 days of hearings and 8 days on the floor. Id.
125. 145 CONG. REC. S12293 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (Senate debate on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). In each other international treaty, committees
filed reports and positions were taken. Many Senators considers these reports
necessary. Id.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
President'sRemarks, supranote 115.
145 CONG. REC. S12268 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (Senate debate on the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). Senator Moynihan states, "[World leaders] are
speaking to us in this near-empty Chamber. Some of our most distinguished
authorities in these matters are here. Most Senators are not." Id.
129. See President's Remarks at Press Conference on the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2035 (Oct. 14, 1999); see also 145
CONG. REC. S12549 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (letter to Majority Leader Trent Lott

signed by 62 Senators requesting a delay on consideration of the CTBT).
130. President's Remarks at Press Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2035 (Oct. 14, 1999).
131. Id.
132. See id.; see also Videotape: A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, supra note 9.
133. Jordan, supra note 76.
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administration attached to the treaty to go to the floor with the
CTBT.14 Many supporters of the CTBT are proponents for its
entry into force because of those safeguards, which allow the U.S.
to back out of the treaty if a national security interest should
arise.135 Supporters of ratification of the CTBT, contingent upon
having the safeguards attached, became unable to vote for
ratification the treaty because the vote did not include the
safeguards. 36
B. The Senate Debate of the CTBT for Ratification
Several Republican Senators contended that the treaty was
defeated because of the dangers and risks for the U.S. that the
CTBT imposes on national security. The Clinton administration
and treaty proponents asserted that the CTBT strongly serves
the interests of the U.S. There are two major arguments in
opposition to the CTBT and many reasons for its ratification.
Perhaps the most overwhelmingly supported argument is that the
vote should have been postponed for a specific time when the
Senate would give it the proper and serious consideration it
deserves.
1.
The Major CTBT Issue is Whether or Not It is
Effectively Verifiable.-The first argument against the CTBT is
that the treaty is not effectively verifiable. Verification, in terms
of the CTBT, is understood to be the process of verifying that
parties to the treaty are not conducting tests that are not allowed
pursuant to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Under the
CTBT, no tests producing explosive yields are allowed. Effective
verification is generally accepted to mean there is a high
confidence that militarily significant cheating will be detected in
a timely manner."'
Scientists argue that there is a possibility that countries
would be able to cheat by conducting sub-kiloton underground
tests with low enough yields that would not be able to be

134. Id.
135. 145 CONG. REC. S12268 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1999) (Senate debate on the
CTBT). Senator Biden stated, "First, the very essential safeguards the chairman
indicated all military guys want, I find it fascinating that the Republican leadership
would not allow the Senate to include those in the treaty. That indicates what a
stacked deck this is and how outrageous is this approach of how we are proceeding
on this is." Id.
136. Id.
137. Kathleen C. Bailey, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The Costs
Outweigh the Benefits, Policy Analysis No. 330, Jan. 15, 1999.
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recognized by the equipment that is available in modern
technology. Scientists concede that any explosions under 500
tons of yield do not provide militarily significant data. The U.S.
is able to conduct adequate nuclear tests at levels of one to ten
kilotons. Any newly designed weapons could feasibly be tested
below the detectable yield range. At present the technology to
detect all levels of explosive yield does not exist and may not for
another ten to fifteen years.'38
Another realistic prospect is that with increased technology,
weapons tests that produce lower yields will be more difficult to
distinguish from natural seismic activities such as earthquakes,
volcanoes at sea and meteorite impacts in the atmosphere.'39
These tests could conceivably be indistinguishable from4 mining
explosions and explosions from geophysical exploration.'0
There is already a concern about a seismic event that
occurred near a Russian testing site in 1999.14' Activity was
detected, but experts were unsure whether the seismic event was
a result of nuclear testing or some natural event. 42 The U.S.
government concluded that the event was an earthquake
occurring beneath the surface of the ocean. 43 Skepticism about
this actual cause of this event remains in some scientists' minds.'"
Another verification issue is that under the CTBT it would
take 29 other nations to agree to an on-site inspection of a
suspected testing site. Treaty opponents argue that it is not a
certainty that the U.S. will be able to get support to investigate a
possible violator of the CTBT.
Although the details presented by the treaty's opponents
concerning verification are true to an extent, the bigger picture
has been left out. Although currently there is not a detection
system in place that can with an absolute certainty detect all
minimal yield tests, if the treaty were to go into effect, the
technology would be available in a short number of years and
cost the U.S. 75% less than what it currently pays to have a
detection system that can not pick up low-yields from testing.
138. Suzanna van Moyland & Roger Clark, The Paper Trail, 54 BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS 1, 1 n.4 (1998).
139. This Week, supra note 111.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Bailey, supra note 137.
144. Id.
145. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Weight of U.S. Treaty Vote Emerges At Vienna
Panel,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,1999, at 14.
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The fact of the matter is that without the CTBT, the U.S. is less
likely to detect "cheaters" than it would with its current limited
detection means. 1,46
The argument that "cheaters" could develop new weapons
from low yield, undetectable tests is also only a narrow view of
the merits of the verification system. Low yield tests that are
presumably undetectable are not the kinds of tests that are going
to make any country's programs dramatically different from
where they are now.' 47 Treaty proponents are confident that the
U.S. can detect what it needs to be able to detect.' 48 Low yield
tests would not undercut the U.S. nuclear deterrent because they
would be so small that they would not affect the U.S. nuclear
capacity. 49
Further, the view that the detection systems may not be able to
pick up low yield explosions is based on presumption. Just recently
a bomb of 0.1 kiloton, only a tenth of what the system has to detect
under the CTBT, was set off in Kazakhstan and picked up in nine
stations around the world.'o The system can only get more reliable
with the CTBT's additional 200 sensors that will go into effect once
the treaty goes into effect.'

Concerning the opponents' argument that there is no
certainty that the U.S. will have the ability to conduct on-site
inspections, the CTBT has been under construction for the
ultimate goal of no nuclear testing in the world. 52 Signatories to
this treaty are not advocating for it because they want to test or
to let others get away with testing when they are abstaining."'
2. The Second Major U.S. Argument Against Ratifying the
CTBT is Whether the U.S. Will Be Able to Maintain Its Nuclear
Deterrent Under the Terms of the CTBT. ' 54 -Senators, experts
and scientists alike argue that the U.S. nuclear arsenal may not
be able to sufficiently withstand time without conducting

146. Test Anxiety, supra note 21.
147. Id.
148. This Week, supra note 111.
149. Id.
150. McNeil, Jr., supra note 145.
151. Indian, Pakistani Nuclear Tests Show Importance of Test Ban Treaty, 3
(June 15, 1998) (unpublished article, on file with the Union of Concerned
Scientists, Cambridge, MA).
152 Id.
153. Id.
154. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on the CTBT Facts
and Fiction, Oct. 8, 1999.
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deployment testing.155 The directors of three of the U.S. nuclear
weapons labs have testified publicly that they could not be
absolutely certain in the future that the stockpile will not
degrade without explosive testing.'56
The ability to ascertain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear
weapons is decreasing because the size of its stockpile is
declining, as is the mix of weapons designs within it. 15 7 There
were only nine types of warheads in the U.S.' stockpile in 2000,
compared to thirty in 1985.158 As noted by Jonathon Medalia of

the Congressional Research Service, "A problem with one
warhead type can affect hundreds or thousands of individual
deployed warheads.., a single problem could affect a large
fraction of the U.S. nuclear force."'59 Scientists also argue that

there is no present available method to simulate nuclear
detonation of the high-performance, complex designs in the U.S.
stockpile."
On the other hand of the stockpile argument, and again
looking at the bigger picture, there are valid reasons to believe that
the Stewardship Stockpile Program implemented by the Clinton
administration and currently being funded for a proposed $45
billion over the next ten years will properly maintain the U.S.
nuclear arsenal and therefore sustain the nuclear deterrent. 6' The
same directors of the three nuclear labs that said they could not be
absolutely certain the stockpile would not degrade over time
without testing, also said that there is a near certainty that the
stockpile could safely be maintained as long as the program is fully
funded.'62 That, of course, would require no budget cutbacks from
the Senate. The directors certify year after year that the stockpile is
safely maintained. 63
155. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Briefing Book: What the Criticsare Saying,
Council For A Livable World, at http://www.clw.org/ef/ ctbtbook/critics.html (last
modified Sept. 30, 1999).
156. This Week, supranote 111.
157. Bailey, supra note 137.
158. Jonathon Medalia, Nuclear Weapons Production Capability Issues
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, June 8, 1998), p. 34.
159. Id.
160. Bailey, supra note 137.
161. President's Remarks at Press Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2035 (Oct. 14, 1999).
162 This Week, supra note 111. Interestingly, 83.5% of the total U.S.' nuclear
weapons tests were conducted not to maintain the safety of the nuclear arsenal,
but to develop new weapons. Test Anxiety, supra note 21.
163. TOM Z. COLLINA, ET AL., FOR A SAFER AMERICA: THE CASE FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY 8 (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers 2d
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Those supporters for the CTBT address their opposition's
argument that the nuclear arsenal will deteriorate and be unsafe
over time in a very straightforward manner. They respond that the
U.S. is not currently conducting any nuclear tests and has been
voluntarily abstaining from testing for eight years.16' If the CTBT
went into force, all significant testing would stop and the U.S.
would stay in the superior position it is in currently."' 5 This will not
remain so if countries are allowed to further develop new weapons
and catch up with the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 66

Under the CTBT as submitted to the Senate with the six
national security safeguards, there would be a way out for the
U.S. if the President, the Senate and the Secretaries of Defense
and Energy all agreed it was necessary to resume testing to
preserve national security through the nuclear arsenal.167 As
Senator Dorgan of North Dakota so acutely put it, the claim is
that "the bombs in storage are unsafe. We have been storing
nuclear weapons for over 40 years in this country. All of a
sudden they are unsafe, on the eve of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty."' '
3. The Benefits of the CTBT Outweigh the Concerns of the
Risks. -The argument is easily made that the U.S. would not be
giving up anything if it ratifies the CTBT. 169 The U.S. would be
gaining a wealth of power and further reassurance that it would
maintain its nuclear deterrent and superiority under the CTBT.7 °
Because of the voluntary moratorium on testing, the U.S. would be
in the same non-testing position that it is currently in, only with the
CTBT, other nations would have the same constraint that is strictly
in the U.S. interest.'7M Without conducting nuclear explosions, other
nuclear weapon states will not be able to develop new advanced
types of weapons with confidence and those nations which are not
nuclear capable yet, will have a very difficult time proliferating

ed. 1999).
164. Test Anxiety, supra note 21.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. President's Remarks at Press Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2035 (Oct. 14, 1999).
168. 145 CONG. REc. S12467 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1999) (Senate Vote of
Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).
169. This Week, supra note 111.
170. U.S. Dep't St., CTBT: Regional Issues and U.S. Interests (1999).
171. Supra note 151.
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nuclear weapons. 72 The CTBT is a17 3tool with which the U.S. can
prevent other countries from testing.
An extremely substantial reason to support the CTBT is if
the U.S. leads, other nations will follow. 17 4 This most certainly
concerns India and Pakistan, the newest members of the nuclear
club. India and Pakistan made great strides when they promised
to sign the CTBT by September 1999.171 Pakistan is waiting for
India to sign and India was waiting for the U.S. to lead by
• 171
example.
Undoubtedly, all eyes were on the U.S. Senate to see what
kind of pressure would be put on holdout countries who had not yet
signed or ratified the CTBT. 77 U.S. ratification of the CTBT is the
equivalent of saying "Gentlemen, start your engines.' 7'
Every
other parliament in the world that is considering the treaty will race
to get their ratification in on time and to be able to join the
international body that is set up to enforce this treaty. 79 As in the
case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, if the U.S. ratifies,
China and Russia would surely ratify very soon after and the union
would create enormous pressures on the international community,
especially rogue states such as India, Pakistan and North Korea. 18°
The U.S. is the first country to specifically reject the CTBT''
The vote was the first time since the Treaty of Versailles that the
U.S. Senate has rejected a major international agreement.
President Clinton called the partisan vote a "new isolationism",
referring to the Treaty of Versailles vote that arguably sparked the
advent of World War 1.13 President Clinton's Special Assistant
for Nation Security Affairs stated that "Our intelligence
community is going to have to put priority over monitoring the

172.

U.S. Dep't ST., CTBT: Regional Issues and U.S. Interests (1999); see TOM

Z. COLLINA, ET AL., FOR A SAFER AMERICA: THE CASE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE

TEST BAN TREATY 3 (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers 2d ed. 1999).
173. This Week, supra note 111.
174. Jordan, supra note 76.
175. Dorgan & Specter, supra note 24.
176. Id.
177. Richard J. Newman, A Mutually Assured Destruction: The Defeat of the
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Had All the Logic and Elegance of a Campus Food Fight,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1999, at 19.
178. Test Anxiety, supra note 21.
179. Id.
180. COLLINA, supra note 163.
181. Kelley, supra note 4.
182. Newman, supra note 177.
183. John Cloud, Is It Trick or Treaty? The Critics Have Blasted the Senate for
Rejecting a Nuclear Test-Ban Pact. Big Deal, TIME, Oct. 25, 1999, at 26.
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nuclear test activities or the nuclear programs activities of
proliferate state or rogue states whether or not there is a CTB
[sic]. So, defeating the CTB [sic] might make some opponents
' 84
feel better the next day, but in the long run we pay a price.
III. The Aftermath of the Vote
A. Will the CTBT Survive?
Many people around the world are predicting the death of
the CTBT as a result of the U.S. Senate's rejection. Others are
predicting a turn of political leadership in the U.S. Congress
after the 2000 election. Will one bring about the other?
1. The Fate of the CTBT Lies Within the U.S. Political
Structure.- In the future, another president, and a new senate, may
be able to dust off the treaty and push it along."8 The remainder of
Clinton's administration had to awkwardly try to convince the
world that the U.S. would honor the terms of an agreement it had
just spurned-and hope that others will follow.'86 Change within
the Senate is not likely to be substantial until the next
Congressional elections. ' This is at least until the Republicans
remain in control of Congress. 88 The GOP may make itself more
vulnerable to a Democratic takeover of the House and Senate if the
C TBT does not return to the Senate floor early on in the Bush
administration. 89
The question remains, however, whether the CTBT is over for
good, or was this just a Bill Clinton problem?' 9 Many people think
that if the administration had had the opportunity to have an
extensive set of hearings in the Foreign Relations, Armed Services
and Intelligence Committees, extending over several months, then,
yes, there might have been a chance to gain ratification. 9 But that
possibility
was foreclosed by the way the Senate handled the
treaty.' 92

184.
185.
186.
187.
World
18&
189.
190.
191.
192.

Test Anxiety, supra note 21.
Cloud, supra note 183.
Id.
Clinton Will Stick By Test Ban; President Decries a 'New Isolationism' as
Scolds U.S. Treaty Vote, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al.
Id.
Jordan, supra note 76.
Walsh, supra note 80.
Videotape: A DAMAGE AsSESSMENT, supra note 9.
Id.
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There are, however, those who think the CTBT is effectively
dead.'93 Technically, the test ban treaty remains at the desk of the
Senate and could be brought back at any time.'4 But in reality, it
was going to take a new president to resurrect the treaty in 2001.195
And in fact, since George W. Bush's election, the treaty, if he is so
inclined, could easily sail through the U.S. Senate."'96
2.
The Fate of the GOP's Leadership Depends on the
American Public.-A June 1999 bipartisan poll by the Mellman
Group revealed that 82% of all Americans supported Senate
approval of the CTBT, with only 14% opposing it."w Supporters of
the treaty can only hope the American public's memories serve
them well when electing their Congress. Now that the treaty went
to the Senate for a vote, the Senate has to be the body to bring it up
again, if ever.'98 Senator Lott gave no indication he wants to see the
treaty brought back to the floor, with or without new conditions."
Former President Clinton doubted that a new Republican
president will stay committed to the treaty." Mr. Clinton predict
that if the U.S. backs off from the CTBT altogether when a new
president comes into office, "Russia will test, China will test and
India and Pakistan will test."2' ' New President George W. Bush,
opposes the treaty but supports a continued testing moratorium,
taking a carefully balanced position. 202 Former Vice President Al
Gore, the defeated Democratic candidate for the presidency, had
vowed to seek ratification again if elected.0 It is now probable,
however, now that Clinton is no longer in office, that the CTBT will
see another day.
B. Will the United States Survive as a Moral Leader?
The United States may have suffered a substantial blow
throughout the international community concerning its role as a
moral leader. The answer depends on how quickly it can bring
193. Crossette, supra note 6.
194. Videotape: A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, supra note 9.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.

198.
199.
200.
201.

Diamond, supra note 22.
Id.
Diamond, supra note 22.
Id.

COLLINA, supra note 163.

202. G. Robert Hillman, Clinton Vents Anger Toward 'Reckless' GOP: Flaws
Doomed Nuclear Treaty Republicans Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 15, 1999,

at 1A.
203.

Id.
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the CTBT back to life and if it can effectively reassure the world
community that it is not only looking out for itself.2° The world
reaction to the Senate vote was swift and left a feeling of bitter
disappointment. 5
Japan predicted the adverse effects of the vote would be
inestimable, while Russia pronounced it was disillusioned by the
U.S. attempt to destabilize the foundation of international
relations.2 Russia also stated a bit dramatically, that the vote
dealt a serious blow to the whole system of agreements in the
field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.2
China
expressed profound regret because the U.S. had great influence
in bringing the CTBT into effect, although vowing to honor the
terms of the agreement and work for speedy ratification. 2"
There is a sense that the CTBT can be resurrected by the U.S.,
but that this time around American leadership to reduce the threat
of nuclear weapons is undermined because the vote set back efforts
to control the spread of terrorist weapons worldwide, endangering
American security for years to come. 20 The status of America as a
world leader may have been weakened with far-reaching
implications.210 If the central world power begins to question the
validity of the treaty, everything shakes up, undermining U.S.
credibility in diplomatic circles, leaving nations wondering how
much faith they can put in the pledges of a country that initiated an
agreement, but won't ratify it.211 The world seems to feel deserted
by the U.S. and all it can do is wait for the effect of the partisan
politics of the Clinton administration and Congress to subside.
C. Will the World Survive Without a CTBT?
India and Pakistan have become the center of the South
Asian arms race. Their positions are very important regarding
the proliferation or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in that
region and the potential for their use during times of friction.
There is a strongly held belief that one nuclear bombing will set
off a spiraling effect and almost as quickly as they start, the
bombings will end.
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1. It Is Unlikely That Pakistan's Coup Will Facilitate an
Expeditious Signing of the CTBT. -Unfortunately, the military

coup did not put Pakistan in a position to accelerate the signing
of the CTBT. The coup overthrew Prime Minister Sharif, with
whom the U.S. and India had been having talks concerning the
signing of the CTBT.212 Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee
was expected to resume peace talks with Sharif in November
2000, but the coup made that unlikely.213 The Pakistani General
leading the coup made it clear that he did not intend to use any
of his own political capital to sign the treaty, but that he would
encourage a national debate, noting that the CTBT is a
contentious issue in Pakistan."'
2. It Is Unlikely That India Will Sign the CTBT Until the

U.S. Ratifies It.-The day after the U.S. Senate vote, India had
already hinted that it might take its time before signing the
treaty after the U.S. rejected it.215 India and Pakistan, by wide
agreement, are not now under as much pressure to sign the treaty,
even though experts believe that the tensions between these two
countries have made their region a potential ground for nuclear
conflict.21 Pressures in India for further testing are present and will
be likely to increase over time becoming difficult to resist now that
the U.S. rejected the CTBT.2 7 The current events in Indian and
Pakistani governments and the U.S. vote not to ratify the CTBT,
leads the CTBT and the Arms Control effort back several steps.
3.
There Is a Dangerous Line On Which the World Walks
Until the Nuclear Arms Race Comes to an End.-In a few more

years, the nuclear powers will exceed a dozen and some say that
if that happens, no one should have any doubt that the decision
of the U.S. Senate was a direct cause.218 India and Pakistan, as
well as other nations, can now continue their testing and implicit
threats to each other, without any justifiable moral admonition
from the U.S.."9 It is difficult to dissuade India and Pakistan from

testing nuclear weapons in each other's backyards if the U.S. will
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not promise to end testing through the CTBT.220 The first nuclear
tests are most likely to come from India and Pakistan or some notyet-nuclear country. The fragile structure of arms control may fail
and the Senate failure to ratify could launch a nuclear weapons race
where there is no longer a tremendous worry of U.S. pressure to
abstain from testing, making the U.S. and the rest of the world a
little more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism. 2'
Pakistan is developing links with North Korea.2 Iran has
approached Pakistan about acquiring missile weapon technology22' They have relationships with Afghanistan's Taliban.
Pakistan's coup leader still considers the Kashmir conflict with
rival India a predominant issue with his country.2 2 Given that
the Pakistani army has tendencies to misconstrue Indian
strategic thinking,26 the risk of war is ever a concern and the risk
of it spiraling out of control is ever present until we attain a
comprehensive nuclear test ban.
IV. Conclusion
In America today, it is disheartening enough when the
public is cavalier about world issues, that we hope our statesmen
act in our best interests. Clearly, a world without nuclear
weapons is a safer world for us all. All in the world would be
that much safer and more secure if only 67 total men and women
could have performed the duties for which they were elected.
President Eisenhower once said, that "[Not achieving a nuclear
test ban] would have to be classed as the greatest disappointment
of any administration, of any decade, of any time and of any
party." 7
The defeat of the CTBT would certainly be one of the
greatest disappointments of Clinton's administration, for the
United States and for the world as a whole. It is now in the
hands of President George W. Bush and the still-republican
controlled Congress. Tensions between India and Pakistan have
only increased and the world only awaits nuclear detonation in
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South Asia and the possible spiraling effect of nuclear
detonation throughout the world.
It is clearly the time for our statesmen to regain the integrity
of our country and the world's trust in the U.S. as a moral leader.
Partisan politics must come to an end respecting foreign policy
and nuclear non-proliferation. Now that the Clinton administration has come to a close, it is the time for the hard feelings
between republicans and democrats to subside and for America's
best-interests to come to the front.
Angelique R. Kuchta

